Political Science: The State of the Discipline II

By Ada W. Finifter | Go to book overview
the right to choose led to the suboptimal result. Indeed, Bernholz ( 1976) and Miller ( 1977) show Prisoners' Dilemma to be a type of liberal paradox -- yet another unexpected connection in the complex labyrinth of results discussed here (also see the more general argument in Breyer and Gardner 1980).
Some major discrepancies between the axioms of the expected utility theory and the experimental data were found quite early ( 1950s and 60s). These early findings are usually associated with the so-called Ellsberg and Allais Paradoxes (see Schoemaker 1982 for an excellent review). A host of experimental studies followed in the 1970s and 80s (e.g., Lichtenstein and Slovik 1971; Grether and Plott 1979). Popular treatments of this technical material are available in Quattrone and Tversky ( 1988), Kahneman and Tversky ( 1982), and Tversky and Kahneman ( 1981). For some alternative directions of research see Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979), Machina ( 1989), Cox and Epstein ( 1987), and Holt ( 1986).
Experimental results in this area are varied. The main context in which a residual of non-self-interested behavior has continually shown up is that of Prisoners' Dilemma experiments (cf. Marwell and Ames 1981). But dissents are heard on this in later, better controlled experiments by Isaac et. al ( 1984 and 1985) and most recently, by Iwakura and Saijo ( 1992). Other studies like McKelvey and Palfrey ( 1991), show that in some non-market contexts one can generate a great deal of altruism.


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Political Science: The State of the Discipline II
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page i
  • Table of Contents v
  • Preface vii
  • Theory and Method 1
  • 1: Texts and Canons: The Status of the "Great Books" in Political Theory 3
  • Conclusion 21
  • Notes 22
  • Bibliography 23
  • 2: Political Theory in the 1980s: Perplexity Amidst Diversity 27
  • Notes 43
  • Bibliography 43
  • Additional Bibliography 46
  • 3: Feminist Challenges to Political Science 55
  • Notes 72
  • Bibliography 73
  • 4: Formal Rational Choice Theory: A Cumulative Science of Politics 77
  • Concluding Comments 97
  • Notes 98
  • Bibliography 101
  • 5: The Comparative Method 105
  • Conclusion 116
  • Notes 117
  • Bibliography 117
  • 6: The State of Quantitative Political Methodology 121
  • Conclusion 148
  • Notes 148
  • Bibliography 150
  • Political Processes and Individual Political Behavior 161
  • 7: Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory 163
  • Conclusion 183
  • Notes 184
  • Bibliography 185
  • 8: The Not So Simple Act of Voting 193
  • Notes 213
  • Bibliography 214
  • 9: The New Look in Public Opinion Research 219
  • Notes 240
  • Bibliography 240
  • 10: Expanding Disciplinary Boundaries 247
  • Conclusion 269
  • Notes 271
  • Bibliography 271
  • 11: Citizens, Contexts, and Politics 281
  • Conclusion: Putting the Puzzle Back Together 299
  • Bibliography 300
  • 12: Political Communication 305
  • Conclusions 323
  • Bibliography 324
  • Political Institutions of the State 333
  • 13: Legislatures: Individual Purpose and Institutional Performance 335
  • Conclusions: Behavior, Institutions, and Theory 354
  • Notes 357
  • Bibliography 357
  • 14: Public Law and Judicial Politics 365
  • 15: Political Executives and Their Officials 383
  • Conclusion 402
  • Bibliography 403
  • 16: Public Administration: The State of the Field 407
  • Notes 423
  • Bibliography 424
  • Nations and Their Relationships 429
  • 17: Comparative Politics 431
  • Conclusion 443
  • Notes 444
  • Bibliography 446
  • 18: Global Political Economy 451
  • Conclusion 474
  • Notes 476
  • Bibliography 477
  • Conclusions 483
  • Conclusions 503
  • Notes 504
  • Bibliography 505
  • Appendix 511
  • Contributors 513
  • Index of Cited Authors 517


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