10. Modelski and
Morgan ( 1985)
argue along similar lines,
but center their criticism of the stability of deterrence on the global
cycle (for details, see pp. 49-50).
11. John Mueller ( 1989)
brings vividly to attention an
oversight present in most war theories: the conditions for war are
effectively and fully elaborated but those for peace are simply noted. Organski and
Kugler ( 1980)
, for example, carefully define conditions
for war under parity and transition, but fail to elaborate with equal
precision the reasons for peace under preponderance. The reverse
tendency, however, is present in the treatment of nuclear deterrence. Intriligator and
Brito ( 1989)
elaborate extensively the conditions for
peace under deterrence, but fail to label the conditions their model
suggests will lead to nuclear war. Indeed, their model suggests that
since 1945, during transitions from the cone of war to compellence or
from compellence to mutual deterrence, a nuclear war would be waged.
The lack of a nuclear war under such conditions is -- after the fact --
dismissed or attributed to luck. This emphasis on the partial outcome
one wishes to explore is prevalent.
Other reasons for nations to oppose nuclear proliferation
might exist. Bueno de Mesquita and
Riker ( 1982)
and Wu ( 1990)
out that proliferation would reduce the bargaining power of a nation
possessing nuclear weapons versus a prospective nuclear power.
This argument is used by Intriligator and
Brito ( 1987)
oppose the development of defensive missile systems that could force
nuclear nations out of stable Mutual Assured Destruction and into
regions of uncertain deterrence (Figure 1).
Decision-making approaches would account for such
phenomena if it can be proven that dramatically different preferences
are held by authoritarian, totalitarian, and democratic populations and
For specific information, consult Claudio Cioffi- Revilla
',s Long Range Analysis of War (LORANOW) Project,
University of Colorado at Boulder.
Paul Diehl ( 1991) bibliographic review of the COW
project provides an excellent overview of data expansions.
Recently, many of these data collections have been
extended under the auspices of the Merriam Laboratory for Analytical
Political Research as part of the Data Development for International
Relations project. Important extensions include Ted Robert Gurr, National Capabilities; Jack Levy, Great Power Wars; Manus Midlarsky
, Major-Minor Powers Wars; John Wilkenfeld, International
Crisis Behavior; Frederick Parson, Interventions; Philip Schaefer,
Paul Diehl, Territorial Change Coding Manual; and Randolph Siverson with Harvey Starr, Data on International Borders,
1816-1965. The quantitative analysis of international events now offers
a number of perspectives: Rudolph Rummel Dimensionality of Nations
(DON); Charles McClelland World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS), Edward Azar Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAT), Charles Herman's Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON), Charles Taylor and
David Jodice World Handbook of Political and
Social Indicators, and Ernst Haas,
Joseph Nye, and
Robert Butterworth's SHERFACTS on conflict management. These now
provide a very extensive cross-temporal and cross-national basis for
empirical research. The data sets are available to the community
through the ICPSR at the University of Michigan. In addition,
interested readers can obtain current issues of the DDIR-Update that
reports on data developments for international relations.
Perhaps Kautilya, who wrote his classic Arthasastra
sometime between 321-296 B.C., deserves equal credit with Thucydides. This work parallels in many respects the critical elements
of Thucydides' postulates on war. However, I know of no evidence
that the Western thinkers who laid the foundations of contemporary war
theory, such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, or Morgenthau, discovered the
writings of Kautilya.
The development of physics is outlined in a clear and
brilliant manner by Hawking ( 1988)
The American Political Science Review, World Politics,
Foreign Affairs, and more recently The Journal of Conflict Resolution.
This change coincides with the appearance of The
Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Achen, Christopher, and
Duncan Snidal. 1989. "Rational Deterrence
Theory and Comparative Case Studies." World Politics 41:143-169.
Allison, Graham. 1969. "Conceptual Models of the Cuban Missile
Crisis." American Political Science Review 63:689-718.
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic
Bendor, Jonathan, and
Thomas H. Hammond. 1992. "Rethinking
Allison's Models." American Political Science Review 86:301-322.
Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. The Causes of War. New York: The Free
Bottome, Edgar M. 1971. The Balance of Terror. A Guide to the Arms
Race. Boston: Beacon Press.
Boulding, Kenneth. 1962. Conflict and Defense. New York: Harper.
Brams, Steven. 1985. Superpower Games. New Haven, CT: Yale
Brams, Steven, and
Donald Wittman. 1981. "Nonmyopic Equilibria in
2×2 Games." Conflict Management and Peace Science 6:39-
Michael Intriligator. 1982. "Arms Races:
Behavioral and Economic Dimensions." In Missing Elements
in Political Inquiry, ed.
John Gillespie and
Dina Zinnes. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Brodie, Bernard. 1946. The Absolute Weapon. New York: Harcourt
Brodie, Bernard. 1959. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bueno de Bruce Mesquita. 1980. "Theories of International Conflict."
In Handbook of Political Conflict, ed.
Ted Gurr. New York: The Free Press.
Bueno de Bruce Mesquita. 1981a. The War Trap. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Bueno de Bruce Mesquita. 1981b. "Risk, Power, and the Likelihood of
War." International Studies Quarterly 25:541-568.
Bueno de Bruce Mesquita. 1985a. "The War Trap Revisited." American Political Science Review 79:156-177.
Bueno de Bruce Mesquita. 1985b. "Toward a Scientific Understanding
of International Conflict: A Personal View." International
Studies Quarterly 29:121-136.
Bueno de Bruce Mesquita. 1988. "The Contribution of Expected Utility
to the Study of International Conflict." Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 18:629-652.
Bueno de Bruce Mesquita. 1990. "Pride of Place: The Origins of
German Hegemony." World Politics 43:28-52.
Bueno de Bruce Mesquita, and
David Lalman. 1986. "Reason and
War." American Political Science Review 80:1113-1131.
Bueno de Bruce Mesquita, and
David Lalman. 1988. "Empirical
Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of
International Conflict." World Politics 41:1-20.
Bueno de Bruce Mesquita, and
David Lalman. 1992. War and Reason. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.