WHETHER THE EXISTENCE OF THE SINGULAR THING IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION 1
1. There is no lack of those who have affirmed so.2 Scotus refers to their views in On II [of the Sentences], dist. 3, q.3,3 and Soncinas in [Questions on] Metaphysics VII, q.32,4 and Henry points it out in Quodlibet II, q.8;5 and the Carthusian attributes it to him and favors it in On II [of the Sentences], dist. 3.6 Fonseca, however, in [ Commentary on the Metaphysics], Bk. V, Ch. 6, q.2, sect. 2,7 refers to Henry Quodlibet V, q.8,8 as denying that individuation is due to existence or to anything intrinsic, but only to the agent. But I have seen no one assert this, being improbable as it is by itself, for although the agent is an extrinsic cause of the individual, nevertheless, its effect is distinct from the agent itself. Moreover, [the agent] causes the individual and confers on it an individual nature; therefore, that whereby the nature is [made] individual is something intrinsic to the individual itself [even though it is caused by an extrinsic cause]. And so, Henry, in the same place, acknowledges explicitly that that whereby the individual is "a this" is something other than matter and other than the agent, which he explains as the notion or disposition of the supposit. Hence, he seems to feel that subsistence is the principle of individuation in all created substances, and so, in the first place where he made the distinction, he was speaking either about existence or about subsistence, and thus, it will be necessary to say something about each [of these here].