WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH
"Coming events," the old saying goes, "cast their shadows before." Yet had this essay been written in 1960 instead of 1963, it would certainly not have paid sufficient attention to the implications of the already visible Sino-Soviet dispute for the East European satellites. Today, when the dispute has become a public and probably irreversible split, the East European Communist parties, like those elsewhere in the world, can only be understood in its context.
Yet Khrushchev's Eastern Europe, with the single exception of small, isolated Albania, has not, at least as yet, changed in his disfavor. On the contrary, he probably still looks upon his work in Eastern Europe and finds it good. It was after all primarily he who, in 1955, initiated the rapprochement with Yugoslavia and who, in 1956, came to terms with Gomulka's autonomy and smashed Nagy's secession. Since November 4, 1956, when Red Army tanks crushed Hungarian independence and neutrality, Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe has been primarily aimed at convalescence and consolidation. Even if one takes into account the Albanian revolt and the already existing signs of some renewed unrest in some of the East European countries, one can still only feel that Khrushchev's policies toward this area must still be considered successful on balance.
In 1953, when Stalin died, Khrushchev (and, quite likely, Malenkov as well) realized that controlled relaxation of tension was necessary in Soviet internal affairs, on the international scene, and in the relations between Moscow and China on the one hand and its East European satellites on the other. Only thus, Khru