In an almost exultant mood Germany's Ambassador Stohrer, on April 14, 1939, reminded Berlin that in recent months the Nationalist government had made extensive and valuable political and economic concessions to Germany in return for the "great and decisive" aid Germany had extended to it during the Civil War that was nearing its end. "In the negotiations carried on with Spain," he boasted, "we have had our way for the most part, even down to details."
Stohrer was not exaggerating. Germany had indeed given great and decisive aid to Spain. Most recently it had furnished the large amounts of military supplies that would make it possible for the Nationalist armies to carry out the Catalonia offensive that was to bring final victory. And Spain had made extensive and valuable concessions in return. What was equally true, however, was that Germany had withheld the aid that was needed for victory until Spain had made the concessions Germany gave most importance to--concessions that, if they should be fully availed of, would deprive Spain of