On Disarmament: The Role of Conventional Arms Control in National Security Strategy

By William F. Burns; Ralph A. Hallenbeck et al. | Go to book overview

1
Background

INTRODUCTION

To fully understand conventional arms control we need to view its history. The chronology outlined in Figure 1.1 allows the reader to visualize events over time, and it presents a picture of international events that have had a direct impact on the conventional arms control process and in confidence building among the members of NATO, the Warsaw Pact (WP), and Neutral and Nonaligned Nations (NNA).


Harmel Report

Modern conventional arms control had its genesis in ideas expressed as early as the 1950s, but it was not until the NATO ministers' report (known as the Harmel Report) in December 1967 on the future tasks of the Alliance that the process began to move toward a conference with the East. The report recommended that NATO try to arrange a forum for mutual arms reductions. In 1968, NATO ministers formally proposed force reduction talks with the East.1 Although the Pact showed no enthusiasm for arms control, the United States and its allies in NATO would not agree to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) unless the East agreed to meet in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) forum.


Mansfield Amendments

Various coincident pressures and events moved both sides to MBFR in addition to the quid pro quo for the CSCE. First, Senator Mansfield introduced legislation in 1966 designed to bring about substantial U. S. troop reductions in Europe;

-1-

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On Disarmament: The Role of Conventional Arms Control in National Security Strategy
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Figures, Maps, and Tables ix
  • Foreword xi
  • 1- Background 1
  • Notes 15
  • 2- Objectives 19
  • Notes 37
  • 3- Procedures 39
  • From Issues to Policies: the Nato High Level Task Force 47
  • From Issues to Policies: the Nato High Level Task Force 50
  • 4- Issues 53
  • Notes 69
  • 5- Definitional Disarmament 71
  • Notes 76
  • 6- Current Cfe Negotiations 79
  • Notes 106
  • 7- Verification 109
  • 8- Current Csbm Negotiations 121
  • Notes 128
  • 9- Future Environment 129
  • Conclusion 138
  • Conclusion 139
  • 10- Alternative Defenses 143
  • Assessing Proposals for Deep Reductions And Defensive Restructuring Following Cfe 154
  • Assessing Proposals for Deep Reductions And Defensive Restructuring Following Cfe 164
  • 11- Risks, Results, and Reflections 167
  • Notes 182
  • Appendix A: Mandate for Negotiation On Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 183
  • Appendix B: Nato Chapter One 189
  • Appendix C: Nato Chapter Two 193
  • Appendix D: Nato Chapter Three 197
  • Appendix E: Western Csbm Proposal 205
  • Glossary 213
  • Bibliography 217
  • Index 223
  • About the Editors and Contributors 227
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