internal composition of military units). NATO has also called for storing a substantial quantity of the TLI, which would permit both NATO and the WTO to reduce dramatically the number of personnel each currently requires in its active, fully manned units.
The proposals of many defensive restructuring advocates are focused on substituting manpower-intensive infantry units for existing tank and artillery units--a possibility that most military leaders on both sides have examined and found wanting. To be sure, the WTO has proposed thin-out zones along the IGB, which would imply at least some Pact readiness to defend its side of the border area with only infantry and obstacles. For a variety of military, geographic, and political reasons, however, NATO is unlikely to accept the Pact thin-out zone proposal, and neither side has indicated any willingness to broaden the concept to include a larger area (as the more radical defensive restructuring proposals would suggest is necessary). Nor has either side been willing to substitute massive barrier plans for armored forces.
Finally, some members of the North Atlantic Alliance are at least looking at the possibility that logistical depots and logistical force structure may hold the key to a restructuring proposal that would be militarily significant and acceptable to both sides. As Napoleon once noted, armies do indeed "travel on their stomachs." Given the logistical consumption levels of modern armies, this truth appears to be even more valid today than in Napoleon's time. On the other hand, constraints on logistical elements appear to present special problems for arms control solutions, and these would have to be overcome before either NATO or the WTO would be willing to address such proposals seriously in CFE.
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