their communique to Newton. They declared themselves willing to resume negotiations with the government, but that the "degree of autonomy represented by the Karlsbad programme . . . no longer satisfied [them] . . . Self-determination within the present Czechoslovak State is at present no longer considered enough."59Hitler had clearly re-written the terms of the settlement two days following his September 12th speech at Nuremberg, where he still employed his camouflaging formula of "self-determination." Henderson relayed the news he received from Deputy Foreign Minister Weizsäcker that a plebiscite was now the only solution. There was nothing haphazard in the communications between Henlein and the German Foreign Ministry. At the same time on the 14th, both Newton and Runciman at Prague perceived that "Anschluss of the Sudeten districts with Germany [now] seemed like a foregone conclusion if peace was to be preserved."60
The British Foreign Office and its emissaries abroad coolly accepted the probability of Czechoslovakia's dismemberment as Hitler's price for peace now. At home, it turned to examining the "pros and cons of settling the question by means of a plebiscite rather than by direct annexation . . .It rests with Hitler rather than with us to decide in the last resort by what process the Sudeten territory is to be transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany."61
The demands had escalated to accord with Hitler's own expansionist agenda, requiring the acquisition of Sudetenland, which included the formidable Czechoslovak military fortifications. Not only was dismemberment of the sovereign State of Czechoslovakia openly threatened now, but also indicated was the intention to deprive the rump State of its carefully wrought means of self-defense.