President Eduard Beneš's original plan on returning from Washington to London in June 1943 had been to proceed directly to Moscow. Both Roosevelt and Churchill had unreservedly recognized that Czechoslovakia could not avoid having a special relationship with her large, powerful neighbor to the east. They had approved the terms of the projected alliance that Beneš had drawn, also with Soviet consent, in April 1943. It was, moreover, a natural concomitant of the Anglo- Russian accord. The terms included Moscow's guarantee of the full sovereignty and unqualified independence of Czechoslovakia, with a pledge of noninterference. The agreement was eased by the absence of any frontier dispute. Declaring itself content to stay on its side of the Carpathian Mountains, Moscow had apparently accepted the return of the Carpatho-Ukrainian province of Czechoslovakia called Ruthenia. Stalin had also complied with the strong desire of Beneš for the transfer of the Sudeten German population out of the country, and "like Britain and the U.S., has assented to the trials of the Nazi war criminals following the war."1
Beneš fashioned his policies on the premise that the Grand Alliance would continue to be operative into the postwar period. He hoped that his treaty with Moscow would serve as a model for other Soviet neighbors and constitute an anti-German bulwark against any recurrence of the irresistible Drang Nach Osten. He further hoped that Polish adherence to the Treaty with Russia would be possible and would complete the line of security against another German attempt at hegemony in the east.
During the intervening months, however, Beneš encountered