sion. I do not want to see an era of blood and chaos to convert men to the only practical methods of justice." Is it conceivable that we should rest our hopes again upon some renovated scheme of mutual assistance? Such systems may look well on paper; but paper, as Catherine of Russia said, is not so ticklish as the human skin--and this is the raw material supplied in the last resort to the ingenuity of statesmen. When the time comes to build again a world organization, they will do well to take care to reckon, as Sir Halford Mackinder had warned them twenty-five years ago, with "realities"--not merely with economic realities, but with physical and geographical, with human and with political realities; in their calculations, the size of continents, the width of seas, the shape of coastlines, the position of rivers, mountains, plains and deserts, of islands, canals and straits--and, above all, of the numbers and character of peoples, must enter as much as the figures for wheat, coal, of petroleum output; their first task, before they can lay down the durable foundations of world organization, will be to consider the materials out of which it is to be built. . . .
In 1919 Walter Lippmann ardently supported the Wilsonian peace program. He helped to prepare an important memorandum explaining to the Allies what each of the Fourteen Points meant. Under Colonel House's direction he worked for Wilson at Paris. But when in 1943 Lippmann published his views on past and present requirements for American foreign policy, the following passages indicated a clear revision in his estimate of Wilson. Lippmann was well aware of this and other departures from his previous opinions. In a preface he explained that the conclusions set down here had been the product of long experience: "I have come to them slowly over thirty years, and as a result of many false starts, mistaken judgments, and serious disappointments."
THE occasion for going to war was Germany's unrestricted use of the submarine against American merchant shipping on the Atlantic routes from North America to the British Isles and France. But the substantial and compelling reason for going to war was that the cutting of the Atlantic communications meant the starvation of Britain and, therefore, the conquest of Western Europe by imperial Germany.
President Wilson avoided this explanation of his decision to intervene, choosing instead to base his decision upon the specific legal objection to unrestricted submarine warfare and upon a generalized moral objection to lawless and cruel aggression. But these superfi-____________________