strike in the face of a certain fatal retaliation. The irrationality of the launch of a nuclear attack in the context of MAD is undeniable. And yet, it is possible that the only certain means of deterring a nuclear attack on oneself or one's allies is to threaten certain nuclear destruction in response. If looked at in that way, nuclear deterrence is the only defense against nuclear attack and must, on that basis be regarded as rational. If the fear of nuclear war also prevented conventional war, perhaps the rationality of nuclear deterrence is even more marked.
Does it work? It is impossible to say. Those who argue that the fear of escalation to nuclear exchange also had the effect of deterring conventional military aggression can be accused of forgetting the suicidal nature of the nuclear deterrent. It is by no means certain that a Soviet conventional assault on West Germany, for example, would have led to a U.S. nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. At the heart of NATO strategy was the notion of extended deterrence, by which the nuclear members of the alliance would retaliate with nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet attack (and not necessarily a nuclear attack) on the nonnuclear members. This was and is, given MAD, tantamount to threatening to commit suicide if someone harms one's friend. Is this credible? Is this rational? As stated above, rationality is in the eye of the beholder.
Nuclear deterrence, by virtue of the profound destructive consequences of its failure, is in a class of its own. Its existence has resulted in nonnuclear deterrent threats being described as conventional deterrence. While nuclear deterrence cannot be regarded entirely separately from other military forms of deterrence, the nuclear threshold represents a distinct psychological barrier. It is to be hoped that the barrier remains in place, particularly in the event of further nuclear proliferation.
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DEVELOPMENT. The all-inclusive process of institutional or organizational fund-raising.
For many years fund-raising activities in nonprofits were seen as a separate and distinct activity. While it was generally believed that public relations had a positive affect on fund-raising results, the usual structure kept the interaction between the functions to a minimum.
In the past two decades, however, a holistic view of "resource development" has taken hold and promoted a more inclusive perspective that includes most activities of the nonprofit as having something to do with fund-raising results. That broader function is now known as "development."
The term "development" is used to describe the entire process of resource acquisition for organizations and institutions. The development office, while primarily responsible for active solicitation of gifts, may also direct the ancillary processes that are conducive to success in fund-raising. This is especially true in higher education.
The following activities have an impact upon fundraising and are often under the direction of the chief development executive:
Public relations. This field may also be found under titles such as community relations, public affairs, or external relations. The work of this unit may entail directing communications and interactions between the organization and its external stakeholders.
Publications. The production of publications in an organization may reside solely in the development office, be under the direction of the public relations office, or be from a communications or publications department. It is generally understood by nonprofits that all communications representing policies, practices, and general information about activities and the current status of the organization can have positive and negative effects on fund-raising results.
Constituent relations. The relationship with ancillary support groups is generally under the direction of development departments, but they may function quite independently, even to the extent of having their own exempt status. It is not unusual to see an alumni office operating as a standalone entity within higher education institutions, or a hospital auxiliary keeping separate accounts and staff assignments.
Grants administration. Many larger nonprofits have offices responsible for the identification of grant opportunities, the processing of grant applications (proactively or in response to requests for proposals), the follow-up to the proposals, and the management and reporting of grants once acquired. These offices usually concentrate on governmental sources, although they may pursue other avenues, such as corporate and foundation funders. Staff is knowledgeable about research and innovative program activities of other staff and faculty and the wide range of sources that can match such endeavors.