terests of the industrialized Northern countries to provide the Third World with aid, on the straightforward grounds that not to do so would fail to develop export markets for the future. To be ungenerous would preclude subsequent profits.
The opposite argument developed as part of the 1990s critique of postwar economic paternalism by the "New Right". The case was made that aid had two deleterious consequences. The first was that it pandered to the disastrous ambitions of Asian, South American, and African leaders, encouraging them to develop showy projects that gratified their egos but impoverished their countries. The second was that, even where this did not occur, a climate of dependency was created and sustained that could only militate against self-sufficiency and economic self-respect in the medium and longer run. Rightly or wrongly, many Third World countries came to believe that this line of argument had outweighed the 1960s consensus and was most obviously to be seen in the policies of the UN financial agencies, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The conditions for finance offered by these institutions seemed to confirm to the poorer parts of the world that their conditions were of less importance than the maintenance of a stable international financial and trading environment.
Ironically, the West found considerable difficulty in responding to the demands for economic aid by the noncommunist successor states that formerly composed the Soviet Union. Having "won" the Cold War, the victors were now asked to bankroll the economic recovery of the East. No Western government was prepared to throw money at the problem; the lessons of irresponsible recipients who failed to develop sustainable infrastructure had been fully absorbed. The cruel jibe that the USSR was never more than "Upper Volta with missiles" became part and parcel of how the West reacted to the new strategic conditions.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was created precisely to address these matters. Sadly, for the poorer states in the less-developed world, the perceived need to grant Russia and its neighbors a special place during the 1990s concentrated aid moneys within the Northern industrial region. Little was available to trickle down to the less-industrialized world. The general economic malaise of the global economy in the first half of the 1990s persuaded those responsible for statecraft that the long-run needs of the Third World could be safely, if with regret, delayed for consideration in due course.
Bauer, P. T., 1985. Reality and Rhetoric: Studies in Economic Development. London: Weidenfeld.
Brandt Commission, 1983. Common Crisis North-South: Cooperation for World Recovey. London: Pan Books.
Thomas, Caroline, 1987. In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations. London: Harvester/Riennes.
Todaro, P. T., 1989. Economic Development in the Third World. London: Longmans.
FORMAL MODELS OF BUREAUCRACY. Theoretical constructs that are a simplification and an approximation of complex, observable bureaucratic events. The goal of this process is to strip away characteristics that are not fundamental or essential to some specific research question while retaining and simplifying those that are central to the query. This filtering allows researchers to quantify and manipulate a finite number of key variables. Exploration and study is accomplished by establishing situational relationships that correspond to actual scenarios. In public administration, the formal modeling approach is often applied to the analysis of bureaucratic behavior. The core idea is that complex organizations and their outputs can be analyzed as sums of discrete, rational subunits that are modeled with formalistic language and structures. In their most basic structure, formal models of bureaucracy establish and defend a finite set of assumptions that presumably underlie the relationship between actors in a specified system. Typically, these are defined in easily quantifiable terms. Hypotheses are tested deductively by applying different levels to the independent variables of interest and studying the ensuing changes in the dependent variables. Since each of the model aspects is controlled by the researcher, this process resembles experimentation rather than empirical research.
To be successful, a formal model of bureaucracy must highlight some previously untested relationship between variables and simultaneously produce an outcome that closely resembles empirical observation. In addition, formal models of bureaucracy face a fundamental trade-off with regard to generality. The greater the number and complexity of assumptions, the closer the model is to some observable phenomenon but the less generalizable it is to a broad class of situations. Therefore, the quality of a specific model is judged by how well these competing criteria are balanced against each other. The determination of model variables and the assumptions about the behavior of these variables is the fundamental process of model building.
In public administration, formal models can easily be divided into two general categories: models with a budgetary focus and models with a noribudgetary focus. The literature on the budgetary relationship between an executive branch agency and a funding legislature is well developed and relatively mature. This class of models begins with William Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government ( 1971). Niskanen used simple microeconomic