problematical political viability of a true antispending political coalition over time.
There are not any easy answers to whether indexing constitutes good public policy. Public policy makers have illustrated a wide range of choices when it comes to indexing. Indexing expenditures, as opposed to revenues, presents a clear example of how policymakers, even of the same ideological persuasion, can be for and against indexing for inflation. Policymakers, in terms of their options, need to be aware of the many positive and negative externalities involved in any decision to index for inflation or otherwise. Explicit indexing of Social Security benefits, for instance, affects not only the fiscal soundness of the trust fund but also saving and replacement rates. Only by accounting for the more implicit and informal dimensions of indexing can a policy analyst fully comprehend the wisdom of indexing a program or a revenue source for inflation. The value of indexing is not easily separated from the value attached to a particular public or social policy, or to government itself.
GEORGE FREDERICK GOERL
Derthick, Martha, 1979. Policymaking for Social Security. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Munnell, Alicia, 1977. The Future of Social Security. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Savoie, Donald, 1990. The Politics of Public Spending in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Steurele, C. Eugene, 1985. Taxes, Loans and Inflation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
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United States Department of Labor, 1992. Bureau of Labor Statistics Handbook of Methods. Washington DC,: GPO.
Weaver, R. Kent, 1988. Automatic Government. Washington DC,: Brookings Institution.
Wildavsky, Aaron, 1980. How to Limit Governmental Spending. Berkeley: University of California Press.
-----, 1992. The New Politics of the Budgetary Process. 2d. ed. New York: HarperCollins.
INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITION. The management practices and organizational culture of the civil service in India.
In 1853 the British Parliament passed the act directing that recruitment to the Indian Civil Service (ICS) be made by open competitive examination (Drewry and Butcher 1988). That the ICS was then the torch bearer of the British tradition in civil service is amply borne out by the fact that it was not until 1870 that the civil service commissioners in London gained control over graduate recruitment for higher posts in the home civil service through open competitive examination. By 1913, there were as many as 30 Indians in the combined Bengal-Bombay-Madras establishment of nearly 800 officers administering the subcontinent from Burma to Baluchistan. Even in 1947, the permanent secretary in Whitehall drew almost the same salary as his ICS counterpart in New Delhi, and the total cadre strength of the ICS was still in three figures.
The uniquely unified civil service structure of the ICS provided talent not only for the top levels of the country's executive bureaucracy but also for the top levels of the country's judiciary and diplomatic posts. There is today a powerful school of thought that considers this heritage a handicap rather than an advantage, providing a rigid hidebound framework suitable for colonial administration that made subsequent restructuring and modernization almost an impossible task. The fact that inclusive of the perquisite of a large bungalow and exclusive chauffeur-driven car, a permanent secretary of the Indian government at New Delhi in 1995 drew less than one-tenth of the salary of his or her counterparts in London-who often share the common background of an Oxbridge education-is only one aspect of this difference, if not deterioration. Indeed, the counterparts at Islamabad, Pakistan, and Dacca, Bangladesh, are even worse off. Equally, the fact that Britain itself is fighting to modernize the bureaucracy is another aspect of the similar realization dawning in India.
The sentiment expressed by India's first prime minister from 1947 to 1964, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru ( 1937), that "no new order can be built up in India so long as the spirit of the ICS pervades our administration and our public services" is, in a sense, still relevant today nearly two decades after the extinction of the last ICS officer from Indian bureaucracy (the last of the Indian civil servants recruited by the British Raj in 1943 retired in the years 1979 to 1980).
Ironically, the ICS tradition of high talent, integrity, and independence has also been replaced with mediocrity, corruption, and sycophancy in the post-ICS structure. And yet, there is some lingering similarity between the two structures-which makes comparative analysis of the failures in India with those in United Kingdom particularly instructive. Although the degree of failure varies, there are interesting lessons to be learned from each case. The apprehension often heard in England is that a growing civil service can be a harbinger of collectivism, even of socialist revolution, and the attempts have been made by democratically elected governments, like those in the UK and India, to reduce its size. The civil service in both of these countries, however, not only survived but grew greatly in size, and also, by and large, in stature, as an essential in-