Generally, in all three countries, the greatest supporters for privatization were some government technocrats who had reached the conclusion that privatization was necessary to alleviate unecessary state responsibility while, at the same time, enabling the executive to cut the budget deficit thus devoting funds to more urgent needs. International pressure was present but not strong enough to swing the balance in favor of privatization. This can partly be attributed to the fact that the economic crisis had not reached yet its zenith. Policy-makers continued to believe that they could continue to manage the situation with mild policy reforms appeasing powerful domestic lobbies crucial to their electoral support. It must also be emphasized that business support for privatization was lukewarm in many quarters. This was partially a function of private companies' uncertainty about the government's commitment to market reforms. Equally important, however, is the fact that powerful economic groups initially thriving under generous government contracts (both as suppliers or contractors) had much to lose from state divestitutre.
When privatization took place in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru it was carried out incoherently. Little or negligible attention was given to efficiency concerns in terms of possible consequences of market changes. The few PEs privatized on occasion, ended up in the hands of their private competitors, thus increasing monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions. Invariably, the overall concern for policy-makers was to raise cash and cut losses in order to trim the deficit and make better use of government resources. This took precedence over redesigning the state's role according to conservative political and economic principles. Ultimately, in all three cases the fiscal impact of privatization was negligible.