inordinate force deprive him of it; and although it may be taken away from him, he will regain it with the slightest mistake of the usurper.
As an example, we have in Italy the Duke of Ferrara,* who withstood the assaults of the Venetians in 1484 and those of Pope Julius* in 1510 for no other reason than the tradition of his rule in that dominion. Because a prince by birth has fewer reasons and less need to harm his subjects, it is natural that he should be more loved; and if no unusual vices make him hated, it is reasonable and natural that he be well liked by them. And in the antiquity and continuity of his rule, the records and causes of innovations die out, because one change always leaves space for the construction of another.*
On Mixed Principalities
But it is the new principality that causes difficulties. In the first place, if it is not completely new but is instead an acquisition (so that the two parts together may be called mixed), its difficulties derive from one natural problem inherent in all new principalities: men gladly change their masters, thinking to better themselves; and this belief causes them to take arms against their ruler; but they fool themselves in this, since with experience they see that things have become worse. This stems from another natural and ordinary necessity, which is that a new prince must always offend his new subjects both through his soldiers and other countless injuries that are involved in his new conquest; thus, you have made enemies of all those you injured in occupying the principality and you are unable to maintain as friends those who helped you to rise to power, since you cannot satisfy them in the way that they had supposed, nor can you use strong measures* against them, for you are in their debt; because, although one may have the most powerful of armies, he always needs the support of the inhabitants to seize a province. For these reasons, Louis XII, King of France,*