rights and duties, because they supply no principle for determining who should fall
within the circle of those with whom the ethically developing individual stands in
the relationships on which the present argument relies. The argument only shows
that benevolence, affection, candour, trust and trustworthiness--qualities which perhaps give life and soul to rules and systems of rights although they do not provide a
logical foundation--are woven into the fabric of our individual well-being. But this
is enough to answer the array of positions developed by Thrasymachus, Glaucon and
Adimantus, according to which justice is not a human virtue because the mutuality
of human beings at their best is a mutuality of fear and exploitation. In the end, what
is wrong with this view is not that it offends the moral sensibilities developed in us
by upbringing, but that it could hold true only of beings who need no upbringing to
be at their best.
The Aristotelian reply also provides what most of us would intuitively find a
more attractive answer than the one forged by Plato in the Republic, according to
which the members of the ideal community, from cobblers to rulers, indeed respect
one another, but what they respect is the pursuit by each of his professional vocation.
This is the source of the communal harmony which Plato denominates 'justice.' The
account fails as a theory of man's social nature, though it may forward Plato's other
great purpose, which is to give a model of the individual soul. For it says nothing to
explain the human value of our being together not merely as well-working functionaries but as excellent individual persons.
Joachim ad 1098 a 12-16 notes that the move cannot be taken for granted.
I have tended to keep this expression (sometimes abbreviated by Aristotle to 'the logos')
untranslated. Some render it 'reason' (or 'right reason'), but this is often misleading so far
as it suggests the faculty of reason; some, 'right rule' or 'rational principle'; but Aristotle's
whole point is that there can be a rational finding that lacks the generality of a rule or what
would nowadays be called a 'principle'.
I agree with Fortenbaugh  that the distinction between rational and reason-responsive
parts of the soul is expressly made for the purpose of ethics; that it is not the same as the On the Soul distinction between intellect and sense (on this, see especially Fortenbaugh 
26); and that these distinctions serve different purposes and are not mutually exclusive.
Similarly, boulēsis (wish) is usually associated with the prescriptive part (the concept of boulēsis is used to elucidate deliberation and prohairesis), but at Pol. 1334 b 21-24 it is
associated with the potentially responsive part. See below, note 40.
See Leighton  for documentation of Aristotle's thinking on ways in which the emotions
Thus practical wisdom, being the virtue par excellence of the prescriptive part qua prescriptive, is not a 'strictly distinct' quality of intellect, as Aristotle shows clearly in NE VI.
This is by contrast with the intellect's 'proper excellence' (cf. 1177 a 17); i.e., theoretic
Because another occasion may differ from this one in some relevant respect which I would
not be able to envisage until I am in it.
This problem is raised by Kosman .
Cooper , 5-10. Emphasis on the explanatory structure permits extending the notion