rights and duties, because they supply no principle for determining who should fall within the circle of those with whom the ethically developing individual stands in the relationships on which the present argument relies. The argument only shows that benevolence, affection, candour, trust and trustworthiness--qualities which perhaps give life and soul to rules and systems of rights although they do not provide a logical foundation--are woven into the fabric of our individual well-being. But this is enough to answer the array of positions developed by Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adimantus, according to which justice is not a human virtue because the mutuality of human beings at their best is a mutuality of fear and exploitation. In the end, what is wrong with this view is not that it offends the moral sensibilities developed in us by upbringing, but that it could hold true only of beings who need no upbringing to be at their best. 51

The Aristotelian reply also provides what most of us would intuitively find a more attractive answer than the one forged by Plato in the Republic, according to which the members of the ideal community, from cobblers to rulers, indeed respect one another, but what they respect is the pursuit by each of his professional vocation. This is the source of the communal harmony which Plato denominates 'justice.' The account fails as a theory of man's social nature, though it may forward Plato's other great purpose, which is to give a model of the individual soul. For it says nothing to explain the human value of our being together not merely as well-working functionaries but as excellent individual persons.


Notes
1.
Joachim ad 1098 a 12-16 notes that the move cannot be taken for granted.
2.
I have tended to keep this expression (sometimes abbreviated by Aristotle to 'the logos') untranslated. Some render it 'reason' (or 'right reason'), but this is often misleading so far as it suggests the faculty of reason; some, 'right rule' or 'rational principle'; but Aristotle's whole point is that there can be a rational finding that lacks the generality of a rule or what would nowadays be called a 'principle'.
3.
I agree with Fortenbaugh [2] that the distinction between rational and reason-responsive parts of the soul is expressly made for the purpose of ethics; that it is not the same as the On the Soul distinction between intellect and sense (on this, see especially Fortenbaugh [2] 26); and that these distinctions serve different purposes and are not mutually exclusive.
4.
Similarly, boulēsis (wish) is usually associated with the prescriptive part (the concept of boulēsis is used to elucidate deliberation and prohairesis), but at Pol. 1334 b 21-24 it is associated with the potentially responsive part. See below, note 40.
5.
Cf. Natali [1].
6.
See Leighton [1] for documentation of Aristotle's thinking on ways in which the emotions affect judgment.
7.
Thus practical wisdom, being the virtue par excellence of the prescriptive part qua prescriptive, is not a 'strictly distinct' quality of intellect, as Aristotle shows clearly in NE VI. This is by contrast with the intellect's 'proper excellence' (cf. 1177 a 17); i.e., theoretic wisdom.
8.
See below, Section X.
9.
Because another occasion may differ from this one in some relevant respect which I would not be able to envisage until I am in it.
10.
This problem is raised by Kosman [2].
11.
Cf. Cooper [1], 5-10. Emphasis on the explanatory structure permits extending the notion

-118-

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Ethics with Aristotle
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Foreword vii
  • Acknowledgements ix
  • Contents xi
  • Chapter 1 Happiness, the Supreme End 3
  • Notes 54
  • Chapter 2 Virtues and Parts of the Soul 57
  • Notes 118
  • Chapter 3 the Voluntary 124
  • Notes 174
  • Chapter 4 Practical Wisdom 179
  • Notes 260
  • Chapter 5 Incontinence 266
  • Notes 307
  • Chapter 6 Pleasure 313
  • Notes 363
  • Chapter 7 Aristotle's Values 366
  • Notes 433
  • Works Cited 439
  • Name Index 445
  • Subject Index 449
  • Index Locorum Aristotelis 453
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