The NE X discussion of pleasure concludes with this passage:
Those [pleasures] which are admittedly disgraceful plainly should not be said to be pleasures, except to a perverted taste; but of those that are thought to be good, what kind of pleasure or what pleasure should be said to be that proper to man? Is it not plain from the corresponding activities? The pleasures follow these. Whether, then, the complete and blessed man has one or more activities, the pleasures that complete these will be said in the strict sense to be pleasures proper to man, and the rest will be so in a secondary and fractional way, as are the activities. (1176 a 22-29)
To identify the pleasure or pleasures that are par excellence human, we have only to identify the best human activity or activities. This, one might think, should be easy, since did not Aristotle say at the beginning that the best activity is the exercise of reason in accordance with virtue, thus deliberately directing our attention to the moral virtues and practical wisdom? But does that formula refer to one kind of activity or more than one? And if to more, are they equally expressive of our nature at its best? This is Aristotle's topic for the rest of NE X and ours in the next chapter. There may have been one or two hints earlier in the Ethics that these questions could arise, but Aristotle begins to face them only now. Perhaps the discussion of pleasure is what finally provokes the questions, and perhaps this is because that discussion shapes answers which could not have emerged before. If, for example, there is reason to doubt whether one kind of human rational activity, even at its finest, is as pleasant as one other, the connections just forged between pleasure and nature would prompt the conclusion that the former should not be awarded the title of 'highest human activity'.