A large body of writings relates to miscalculation, usually under a title which speaks not of miscalculation but of intelligence failure, misperception, the decision process, or the case being studied. I have found the following works useful and informative, but they are only a subjective sample of a much larger number.
Agranat, Shimon (president of the Commission of Inquiry into the Yom Kippur War), Report of the Commission of Inquiry ( April 2, 1974). A partial text can be found in the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 4, no. 1 ( Jerusalem: Magnes Press), pp. 70-90. This is the basic document describing Israel's failure to evaluate properly the Egyptian preparations for attack in October 1973.
Hughes, Thomas, The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: A Nontheological Approach. Headline Series no. 233, Foreign Policy Association, New York, December 1976. A former director of intelligence and research in the Department of State and president of the Carnegie Endowment discusses the problems of intelligence gathering and assessment and what happens to information in the bureaucracy. Readable and informative.
----, "Present at the Escalation". In Secrecy and Foreign Policy, ed. Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband ( Oxford, 1974) More insightful comment on the intelligence process.
Knorr, Klaus, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of Cuba". World Politics 16 ( April 1964). An early study of the phenomenon of intelligence failure.
Shlaim, Avi, "National Intelligence Failures: The Case of the Yom Kippur War". World Politics 28 ( April 1976), pp. 348-80. The best single description of why the Israelis were caught napping in 1973, based largely on the Agranat Report.
Stein, Janice Gross, "'Intelligence' and 'Stupidity' Reconsidered: Estimation and Decision in Israel, 1973". Journal of Strategic Studies 3, no. 2 ( September 1980). A revisionist look at the "simplistic explanation of surprise and failure offered by the Agranat Commission and widely accepted by participants and critics alike" (including Avi Shlaim).
Whaley, Barton, Codeword Barbarossa. Boston: MIT Press, 1973. A fascinating study of the impact of mindset on intelligence: why Stalin refused to take seriously the warnings that Germany was about to attack the Soviet Union in 1941.
Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor: Warnitig and Decision. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. The classic study of why the United States was unprepared for the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941.
----, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight". Foreign Affairs 43 ( July 1965). A useful comparison of the Cuban missile and Pearl Harbor crises.
Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Glenview, Ill:, Scott, Foresman, 1971. A ground-breaking study of the decisionmaking process in the Cuban missile crisis, positing three models for ex