The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East

By Richard Bordeaux Parker | Go to book overview

Annotated Bibliography

ON MISCALCULATION IN GENERAL

A large body of writings relates to miscalculation, usually under a title which speaks not of miscalculation but of intelligence failure, misperception, the decision process, or the case being studied. I have found the following works useful and informative, but they are only a subjective sample of a much larger number.


Intelligence Failures

Agranat, Shimon (president of the Commission of Inquiry into the Yom Kippur War), Report of the Commission of Inquiry ( April 2, 1974). A partial text can be found in the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 4, no. 1 ( Jerusalem: Magnes Press), pp. 70-90. This is the basic document describing Israel's failure to evaluate properly the Egyptian preparations for attack in October 1973.

Hughes, Thomas, The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: A Nontheological Approach. Headline Series no. 233, Foreign Policy Association, New York, December 1976. A former director of intelligence and research in the Department of State and president of the Carnegie Endowment discusses the problems of intelligence gathering and assessment and what happens to information in the bureaucracy. Readable and informative.

----, "Present at the Escalation". In Secrecy and Foreign Policy, ed. Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband ( Oxford, 1974) More insightful comment on the intelligence process.

Knorr, Klaus, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of Cuba". World Politics 16 ( April 1964). An early study of the phenomenon of intelligence failure.

Shlaim, Avi, "National Intelligence Failures: The Case of the Yom Kippur War". World Politics 28 ( April 1976), pp. 348-80. The best single description of why the Israelis were caught napping in 1973, based largely on the Agranat Report.

Stein, Janice Gross, "'Intelligence' and 'Stupidity' Reconsidered: Estimation and Decision in Israel, 1973". Journal of Strategic Studies 3, no. 2 ( September 1980). A revisionist look at the "simplistic explanation of surprise and failure offered by the Agranat Commission and widely accepted by participants and critics alike" (including Avi Shlaim).

Whaley, Barton, Codeword Barbarossa. Boston: MIT Press, 1973. A fascinating study of the impact of mindset on intelligence: why Stalin refused to take seriously the warnings that Germany was about to attack the Soviet Union in 1941.

Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor: Warnitig and Decision. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. The classic study of why the United States was unprepared for the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941.

----, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight". Foreign Affairs 43 ( July 1965). A useful comparison of the Cuban missile and Pearl Harbor crises.


Decision Making

Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Glenview, Ill:, Scott, Foresman, 1971. A ground-breaking study of the decisionmaking process in the Cuban missile crisis, positing three models for ex

-263-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Maps vi
  • Acknowledgments vii
  • Introduction ix
  • The June War 1
  • The Soviet Warning 3
  • Moscow's Explanations 21
  • The Egyptian Reaction 36
  • From Deterrence to Disaster 59
  • The American Role 99
  • The War of Attrition 123
  • War and Nonwar 125
  • Misjudgment on the Nile 148
  • The Israel-Lebanon Peace Agreement of 1983 165
  • The Israeli Invasion of 1982 167
  • The Negotiations 179
  • The Final Reckoning 193
  • Conclusion 212
  • Appendix 224
  • Notes 247
  • Annotated Bibliography 263
  • Index 270
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 273

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.