More Impertinent Distinctions
Many thinkers, including almost all orthodox Catholics, believe that euthanasia is immoral. They oppose killing patients in any circumstances whatever. However, they think it is all right, in some special circumstances, to allow patients to die by withholding treatment. The American Medical Association's policy statement on mercy killing supports this traditional view. In my paper "Active and Passive Euthanasia" 1 I argued, against the traditional view, that there is in fact no moral difference between killing and letting die—if one is permissible, then so is the other.
Professor Sullivan2 does not dispute my argument; instead he dismisses it as irrelevant. The traditional doctrine, he says, does not appeal to or depend on the distinction between killing and letting die. Therefore, arguments against that distinction "leave the traditional position untouched."
Is my argument really irrelevant? I don't see how it can be. As Sullivan himself points out,
Nearly everyone holds that it is sometimes pointless to prolong the process of dying and that in those cases it is morally permissible to let a patient die even though a few more hours or days could be salvaged by procedures that would also increase the agonies of the