On April 16, 1953, the president addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors, delivering what became known as his " Chance for Peace" speech. In it he outlined the essential ingredients of his thinking about contemporary international affairs and America's foreign policy. Implicit in his argument was a design for American use of the United Nations in the cold war era. The "Eisenhower model" for employing the world organization as an element in the overall U.S. strategic defense of the "free" world served as the basic template for U.S.-UN relations not only during his tenure, but also during that of his immediate successors, presidents Kennedy and Johnson.
Eisenhower argued that the period since 1945 had seen the hopes for peace "waver, grow dim, and almost die." 18 The sense of common purpose that permeated the creation of the United Nations had "lasted an instant and perished." In its place there had been eight years of "fear and force" during which the free world had been driven to create a military behemoth to block the aggressive aspirations of Soviet leaders. Eisenhower could see only two possible outcomes emerging from this scenario: at worst, atomic war; at best, "a life of perpetual fear and tension, a burden of arms draining the wealth and the labor of all peoples." 19 The only opportunity to change the course of events, in his view, resided with the leadership in Moscow. Concrete signs of goodwill were needed from the Soviets before sufficient trust could be established between east and west to allow for progress on the issues separating the two sides. Deeds, not words, were required of the new Soviet leadership. Specifically, Eisenhower indicated that he would take as evidence of Russian seriousness helpful Soviet efforts to achieve an armistice in Korea, the signing of an Austrian treaty (which had not been concluded since the war ended), progress on the reunification of Germany, repatriation of prisoners of war still being held in the USSR, and an end to communist attacks on French forces in Indochina. 20 Instead of recrimination, the president outlined a litmus test of Soviet____________________