apathetic, it was now driven into the arms of the FLN, swelling the organization's ranks and increasing its popular support. Domestic public opinion in France was similarly outraged, undercutting popular backing for continuing the struggle and creating deep fissures in French civil-military relations. Massu and his men stubbornly consoled themselves that they had achieved their mission and defeated the rebels' attempt to seize control of Algiers; but this military victory was bought at the cost of eventual political defeat. Five years later the French withdrew from Algeria and granted the country its independence.
Massu remained unrepentant, maintaining consistently that the ends justified the means used to destroy the FLN's urban insurrection. The battle was won and the terrorists' indiscriminate bombing campaign was ended. At the same time, there is no doubt that this 'success' cut both ways. The FLN's tactical defeat in the city resulted in yet another complete reassessment of its strategy. Large-scale urban terrorism was now abandoned alongside the FLN's belief that France could be defeated militarily. The group's high command also concluded that the struggle could not be won inside Algeria alone; accordingly, the rebels relocated their operational bases to Tunisia, from where they pursued a rural hit-and-run strategy, making cross-border raids from their newly established sanctuaries. But the 'Battle of Algiers' remains perhaps the most significant episode in bringing about the FLN's subsequent triumph, in that it succeeded in focusing world attention on the situation in Algeria, just as Abane had calculated. By provoking the government to over-react with torture, summary executions and other repressive tactics, it also revealed the bankruptcy of French rule, thereby hastening the complete destruction of Algérie Française.
The ethno-nationalist insurrections that followed the Second World War had a lasting influence on subsequent terrorist campaigns. Although governments throughout history and all over the world always claim that terrorism is ineffective as an instrument of political change, the examples of Israel, Cyprus and Algeria, and of Begin, Makarios and Ahmed Ben Bella (the FLN's leader, who became Algeria's first president), provide convincing evidence to the contrary. Admittedly the establishment of these independent countries was both confined to a